Annuities provide insurance against outliving one's wealth. Previous studies have indicated that, for many households, the value of the longevity insurance should outweigh the actuarial unfairness of prices in the voluntary annuity market. Nonetheless, voluntary annuitization rates are extremely low.
Annuities provide insurance against outliving one's wealth. Previous research by Mitchell et al. (1999) has suggested that although annuities are actuarially unfair, load factors alone cannot explain the almost total absence of voluntary annuitization among single individuals. Brown and Poterba (2000) find that longevity risk pooling reduces the value of annuitization to married couples, but not to levels that would, for plausible parameter values, explain the almost total lack of voluntary annuitization.
The above authors compare an optimal decumulation of unannuitized wealth with an alternative of annuitizing all unannuitized wealth at age 65. In practice, households can annuitize at any age, can annuitize any proportion of their unannuitized wealth, and can return to the annuity market as many times as they wish. If there are advantages to delay or if the marginal value of further annuitization decreases with increases in the proportion of wealth that is pre-annuitized, then the value of annuitizing at least some wealth at the optimal age will be even greater. The almost total absence of voluntary annuitization is thus even more puzzling than it first appears.
We therefore extend the above authors' work by allowing households to annuitize any proportion of their unannuitized wealth at any ages. We examine whether there are age-related variations in the degree of actuarial unfairness, as these might affect the optimal age at which to annuitize. We provide evidence that the degree of actuarial unfairness does not, in fact, vary significantly with age. We also find that small age-related variations in the degree of actuarial unfairness would not significantly affect the optimal age.
Assuming the same proportions of pre-annuitized wealth and degrees of risk aversion as those used in previous research, we find that it is usually optimal for married couples to delay annuitization for substantial periods. However, under the same assumptions, it is usually optimal for single individuals to annuitize soon after age 65. Even when a household does annuitize, it will usually choose to annuitize only part of its unannuitized wealth. An increase in the degree of actuarial unfairness has the effect of inducing a delay in annuitization and a reduction in the amount annuitized. Highly risk-averse households will find it optimal to annuitize larger proportions of their wealth and at younger ages. To illustrate, assuming a typical annuity expected present value (EPV) of 85.7 %, a married couple with none of its wealth pre-annuitized will wish to annuitize at age 77 when its coefficient of risk aversion is two, and at 70 when its coefficient of risk aversion is five.
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When half the household's wealth is pre-annuitized, the couple will never annuitize when their coefficient of risk aversion is two, but will annuitize at 73 when the coefficient equals five. Previous research has shown that for any given proportion of pre-annuitized wealth, single women will value annuitization more highly than married couples, due to the absence of longevity risk pooling. As a result, and in contrast to married couples, single men and women will usually wish to annuitize either at age 65, the starting point of our calculations, or very soon thereafter. Of course, when offered an actuarially fair annuity, all household types immediately annuitize all of their unannuitized wealth, provided the survivor benefit and age profile of the income stream are appropriate.
When we assume that households have mortality equal to that of the average annuitant, it becomes optimal for households to annuitize at younger ages, at smaller degrees of risk aversion, and to annuitize larger proportions of their unannuitized wealth.
Although the above analysis provides an explanation of why married couples do not annuitize on retirement, it does not explain why few households appear to annuitize at any age. Previous authors either disregarded pre-annuitized wealth, or assumed that one half of the household's wealth was pre-annuitized through employer pensions and Social Security. Although the value of employer pensions and Social Security feature prominently in many models of the retirement decision, and although these models often also include measures of total wealth, our paper represents the first attempt to construct balance sheets for households entering retirement, inclusive of the value of pre-annuitized wealth. The closest analysis is Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick, and Steinmeier (1997) , who examine data from wave 1 of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a panel of individuals born 1931-41 and their spouses of any age. However, at that wave, the panel was only aged 51-61, and some way off retirement. Their analysis also failed to distinguish between annuitized and unannuitized pension wealth.
We therefore analyze data from waves 2 to 5 of the same dataset, constructing balance sheets for households as they turned 65, and carefully distinguishing between annuitized and unannuitized pension wealth. We find that the proportion of preannuitized wealth was generally much larger than 50 %. Our simulations indicate that, given plausible assumptions regarding actuarial unfairness and levels of risk aversion, these married couples are too highly annuitized to voluntarily annuitize at any age, regardless of pension type. Although single women have even higher proportions of pre-annuitized wealth, it can sometimes be optimal for a single woman to annuitize. If annuitization is optimal, the most appropriate age is either at age 65 or soon thereafter.
Thus, as far as the median household is concerned, if there is an 'annuity puzzle ', it would appear to be restricted to single individuals. Wealthier households typically have smaller proportions of pre-annuitized wealth. For plausible utility functions and assuming that their greater wealth is not a reflection of a stronger bequest motive, they will value annuitization more highly. There is also a strong and well-documented relationship between wealth and longevity.
2 If wealthier households believe that they have lower than average mortality, this will further increase the value they place on annuitization. It is not unreasonable to assume that the median household believes it has population average mortality. However, calculating optimal plans for wealthier households involves constructing wealth-related subjective mortality tables, and is a subject that we defer to future research.
Compared with currently retired households, subsequent birth cohorts will have much smaller proportions of pre-annuitized wealth, as defined contribution pensions, which almost never mandate annuitization, displace DB plans. The increase in the Social Security normal retirement age will reduce the real value of Social Security wealth. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2002) project that, as a result, the mean 401(k) plan balance of the cohort retiring in 2025 will exceed their mean Social Security wealth, even allowing for the impact of increased longevity on the latter. The reforms proposed by the President's Commission (2001), if enacted without a provision for mandatory annuitization, will further reduce the compulsorily annuitized proportion of a household's wealth. Munnell (2003) highlights the impact of projected increases in Medicare part B premiums and in the proportion of retirees that will pay income tax on Social Security. She calculates that average Social Security income replacement rates could drop from the current 41.2 % to 26.9 % by 2030.
We simulate the impact of changes in pension structure on annuitization by replacing DB pension wealth by DC wealth of equivalent present value, and then recalculating the household's optimal annuitization strategy. Annuitization becomes more attractive to both married couples and single women, but couples will only annuitize when the annuity expected present value and coefficient of risk aversion are both at the top of our assumed range. Even then, they will delay until age 76.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section discusses trends in pension provision and in the amount and composition of household wealth. The second summarizes the findings of previous research. The third describes the results of our simulations. Section four offers explanations for the lack of demand for annuities among the currently old and forecasts demand among the HRS and subsequent birth cohorts as they age. Section five concludes.
Trends in pension provision and household wealth

Pension provision
In the United States, the past 20 years has seen a major shift in employer pension provision away from annuitized defined benefit (DB) pension plans towards 401(k) and other defined contribution (DC) plans. Friedberg and Webb (2003) report that among employees with a pension plan in 1983, 87% had a DB plan and 40% a DC plan. By 1998, 44% had a DB plan and 79 % a DC plan. However, DB pensions still predominate among workers nearing retirement. Among pensioned employees in the HRS in 1992 and then aged 51-61, 80 % had a DB plan and 40 % a DC plan.
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DB pension plans typically pay benefits in annuitized form, although report an increase from 14 to 22% over the period 1991-1997 in the proportion of DB plans offering a 100% lump sum option. By comparison, Brown, Mitchell, Poterba, and Warshawsky (2001) find that annuity payments are available to only 17 % of private sector DC pension participants. Furthermore, the Investment Company Institute (2000) reports that annuitization is almost never compulsory in such plans.
4 It follows that the displacement of DB by DC plans will lead to a considerable fall in coming years in the proportion of employee pension wealth that is compulsorily annuitized.
A simple calculation of the increase in the proportion of pension plans that offer a lump sum option considerably understates the trend away from compulsory annuitization. As the 401(k) system matures, the average duration of participation and therefore the average plan balance will increase. Using employee reported data, we calculate mean 401(k) wealth to be $74,566 in 1992 dollars among HRS households aged 65 who reported ever having participated and who had not closed their account. The distribution of plan balances is highly skewed, and the corresponding median plan balance is only $26,353. As only 20 % of HRS households reported having accounts, the mean balance over all households is only $15,792. In contrast, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2002) project mean balances averaged over all households of $103,000 and $136,500 respectively for the cohorts retiring in 2025 and 2035.
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Household wealth
Using data from waves 2 to 5 of the HRS, we show in Tables 1a-e, the financial position at the first interview after age 65, of those HRS households that had turned 65 by 2000. At that interview 45 % of married men and 38% of single women in the panel had attained age 65, and, of these, 50 % of married men and 46 % of single women had retired. Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) have documented substantial discrepancies between employer and employee reported pension data. It is possible that the accuracy of the employee reported data has improved as people enter retirement and become better aware of their entitlements. On the other hand, the accuracy of the employer provided data, which was collected once only, in 1992, may well have declined as it was applied to each succeeding wave. We have therefore chosen to calculate pension wealth from self-reported pension and Social Security data. We assume all households have population average mortality.
We rank households by total wealth and calculate the mean of each wealth component for each decile. There are significant differences in the amount and composition of total wealth between married couples, single men and single women. We therefore report separate results at Tables 1a and 1b for married couples and single women, there being insufficient single men in the sample to permit an analysis by 4 Individuals may withdraw funds from their pension plan and buy a non-qualifying annuity. This is less tax-efficient than purchasing a qualified annuity within the DC plan or rolling the funds over into an IRA and then purchasing a qualifying annuity within the IRA. Qualified annuity payments and nonannuitized withdrawals from pension plans are both taxed as income, but tax regulations require that the recipient of the non-qualified annuity also pay tax on the part of the annuity that is deemed not to represent a return of capital; the so-called 'inclusion ratio'. Differences between the taxation of the insurance company's qualifying and non-qualifying life funds may also affect the annuity rates offered. Men may find it advantageous to take an IRA annuity rather than one offered by the pension plan because pension plans, including 401(k)s, are legally required to offer unisex annuity rates. 5 Their Table II in 1992 dollars and assuming a 50:50 bond/stock portfolio. 6 An individual is considered to be retired if he reported that he/she was 'completely retired' and that he was not doing any work for pay. Notes: Data from Health and Retirement Study, waves 2 to 5. Sample -Single women who turned 65 in any of the waves 2 to 5. Sample size -523 observations, from which three observations falling in the 100th wealth percentile were dropped resulting in a sample of 520. We excluded the 100th percentile from the 10th decile and the wealth upper cut-off point is $1,523,978. The present values of social security and employer defined benefit pensions were calculated using a real rate of interest of 3 % and an inflation rate of 2.5 %. Annuitized wealth equals the sum of SS and DB pensions. Figures are in 2000 dollars and weighted using household weights. Variation between deciles in number of observations is due to weighting. Note : Data sources and assumptions as in the previous tables. wealth decile. 7 Table 1c reports overall means. Tables 1d and 1e report means for the median 20 % by household and pension type.
Household annuitization decisions
Married couples are much wealthier than single individuals, with the difference being greatest in unannuitized financial wealth and least in Social Security wealth. In the top decile, the non-retirement financial wealth of single women is only 41% of that of couples. Among both couples and single women, housing and Social Security wealth is much more equally distributed than employer pension wealth, with non-pension financial wealth being highly concentrated among the wealthiest households.
Among couples, mean Social Security wealth varies from $142,111 in the bottom decile to $301,920 in the top.
8 Mean DB and DC employer pension wealth ranges from $11,253 in the bottom decile to $517,467 in the top. The overwhelming majority of employer pension wealth is held in DB plans. DC plan balances average 7% of retirement wealth in the bottom nine deciles rising to 15 % in the top decile. As a result, mean annuitized wealth exceeds 83 % of financial wealth among couples in all the first five deciles and is still 49 % in the top decile.
Single women are even more highly annuitized than married couples, with mean annuitized wealth exceeding 92% of total financial wealth in the first five deciles and equaling 53 % in the top decile. We calculate that only 11 % of single women have less than half of their financial wealth in annuitized form, and only 25% have less than three-quarters. A majority of single women has almost no annuitizable financial wealth and only 30% have more than $50,000.
We compare our results with Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick, and Steinmeier (1997) analysis of wave 1 of the HRS when the panel was aged 51-61. We obtain somewhat higher proportions of pre-annuitized wealth, primarily Social Security. This is to be expected as we include SSI. In addition, Gustman et al. pro-rated pension and Social Security accruals to individuals' ages in 1992, whereas we calculate pension and Social Security wealth at age 65. To check the validity of our figures, we compared the average Social Security benefit, exclusive of SSI, reported by the HRS sample with the average benefits reported by the Social Security Administration. Our capital values correspond to mean monthly benefits of $807 and $558 for men and women, respectively, compared with Social Security Administration estimates of $837 and $652 respectively. Mitchell and Moore (1997) further analyze Gustman et al. data and show that it is only above the 95th percentile of total wealth that average non-pension financial wealth exceeds combined pension and Social Security wealth. They do not distinguish between annuitized and unannuitized pension wealth, but, as our analyses show, except in the top wealth decile, the average DC plan balance in this cohort is quite modest. They sort households into wealth deciles, and report, for each decile, the Social Security and employer pension proportions of total wealth. They do not 7 There were 167 single men of whom 76 had a DB pension, four a DC and 87 had no pension. 8 Excluding Supplementary Security Income (SSI) from Social Security wealth produces very low levels of annuitized wealth in the bottom wealth decile. We therefore include SSI, assuming that current SSI benefits will continue in payment for the remainder of the individual's lives. report results for couples and single households separately. Their figures are therefore not strictly comparable with ours. They arrive at lower valuations of Social Security wealth for each wealth decile, reflecting the fact that they were observing the sample at somewhat younger ages, and were excluding SSI. Nonetheless, they show a similar relationship between wealth decile and proportion of pre-annuitized wealth to that reported in our Table 1 . Including housing wealth, the proportions of pre-annuitized wealth they calculate for the sixth to top deciles are 60, 58, 57, 63, and 31 % respectively, compared with our married couple results of 63, 56, 50, 49, and 32 %. Tables 2a-e report the same analysis for the Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) households in the year 2000. This is a panel born in 1923 or earlier, and their spouses of any age. Their distribution of wealth by category and wealth decile is similar to that of the HRS households. Average pension and Social Security wealth is much smaller, mainly reflecting the shorter remaining life expectancy of this cohort.
2 Findings of previous research Yaari (1965) was the first to derive conditions under which full annuitization was optimal. His restrictive assumptions included complete markets, the absence of a bequest motive, and the availability of actuarially fair annuities. Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2003) relax the assumption of complete markets and find that full annuitization is often no longer optimal.
Most of the literature has analyzed the annuitization decision by considering its effect on expected utility. An alternative approach, taken by Milevsky (1998 Milevsky ( , 2000 , has been to calculate the impact on expected returns of deferring annuitization, and the probability that deferral will leave the individual no worse off. Assuming that only nominal annuities are available, and using Canadian data, he investigated a strategy of postponing annuitization and investing in equities.
10 He assumed that individuals who postponed annuitization would consume from their unannuitized wealth at a rate equal to the annuity income they could have initially obtained. In practice one would expect individuals to re-evaluate their consumption plans in the light of realized investment returns. He found that individuals who postpone annuitization stand a high probability of eventually being able to buy a larger annuity.
Probability based measures provide little guidance as to what risk of failure is acceptable for any given level of risk aversion and for this reason we favor utilitybased analyses.
11 Mitchell et al. (1999) used numerical optimization to calculate a 10 Investment linked annuities have in fact been available since 1952 when TIAA-CREF launched its CREF equity-based immediate and deferred annuities. Initially, CREF immediate annuities could only be purchased with the proceeds of CREF deferred annuities, and in the first year only six immediate annuity contracts were sold, Greenough (1990) . The market remains small. The National Association for Variable Annuities (2002) reports overall 2001 immediate annuity sales of $10.2 billion, of which only $0.6 billion were variable. Brown and Poterba (2000) point out that approximately half of immediate annuity sales are for period certain rather than for life contingent annuities. If applied pro-rata, this suggests sales of immediate life contingent variable annuities of $300 million a year. 11 Utility-based models usually need to be solved using numerical optimization. Such models are only computationally feasible if one assumes that only a limited range of investment options is available. Notes: Data from HRS -wave 5. Sample: AHEAD married couples in wave 5. Sample size -1,012 observations, from which 12 obs falling in the 100th wealth percentile were dropped resulting in a sample of 1,000. We excluded the 100th percentile from the 10th decile and the wealth upper cut-off point is $4,552,860. The present values of SS and employer DB pensions were calculated using a real rate of interest of 3 % and an inflation rate of 2.5 %. Annuitized wealth equals the sum of SS and DB pensions. The AHEAD data set does not contain information about DC pensions, but only a very small proportion of these oldest households will have a DC pension, some of which may have been rolled over into IRAs. Figures are weighted using wave 5 household weights. Notes : Data from HRS -wave 5. Sample : AHEAD single women. Sample size -1579 observations, from which 13 obs falling in the 100th wealth percentile were dropped resulting in a sample of 1566. We excluded the 100th percentile from the 10th decile and the wealth upper cut-off point is $1,973,930. The present values of SS and employer DB pensions were calculated using a real rate of interest of 3 % and an inflation rate of 2.5 %. Annuitized wealth equals the sum of SS and DB pensions. The AHEAD data set does not contain information about DC pensions, but only a very small proportion of these oldest households will have a DC pension, some of which may have been rolled over into IRAs. Figures are weighted using wave 5 household weights. Note : Data sources and assumptions as in the previous tables. utility-based measure of the wealth equivalent of an annuity. They defined the wealth equivalent as the expected present value of the annuity at which an individual would be indifferent between annuitizing all his unannuitized assets and continuing to hold those assets in unannuitized form. Assuming a real interest rate of 3%, an inflation rate of 3.2 %, a rate of time preference of 1 %, no bequest motive, no pre-existing annuities, population mortality, and a coefficient of risk aversion equal to one, they calculated that in 1995 in the United States the before tax wealth equivalent of the typical nominal annuity was 0.659 for a single male. At a coefficient of two, the wealth equivalent fell to 0.619. If half the individual's wealth was held in the form of a pre-existing real annuity, the wealth equivalents increased to 0.730 and 0.695 under the same assumptions. As discussed above, only a very small proportion of single households have half or less of their financial wealth in annuitized form. These results are therefore representative only of the wealthiest households who may also have a stronger than average bequest motive.
In the same paper, they calculated annuity EPVs at ages 55, 65, and 75. At age 65, these varied from 75.6 to 92.7 %, depending on whether one discounts the payments at the Treasury or corporate bond yield curve, and whether population or annuitant mortality tables are used. A comparison between these EPVs and the reciprocals of the wealth equivalents referred to in the preceding paragraphs would, at first glance, suggest a substantial role for annuities in financing retirement consumption.
We assume in our calculations that the degree of actuarial unfairness of annuities does not vary with age or marital status. Although Finkelstein and Poterba (2000) find evidence that the degree of adverse selection varies with annuity type, a comparison of EPVs in Mitchell et al. (1999) suggests that, although the differences between ages 55 and 65 are more substantial, the degree of actuarial unfairness does not change significantly between 65 and 75. There is no clear pattern to the changes between ages 65 and 75 and the largest single change is only 2.3 %. At very young ages, the insurance company's assumptions regarding rates of return will have a proportionately greater effect on the price of the annuity. At these ages, the insurance company's obligations extend well beyond the life of even the longest maturity bond, and differences between the rate of return used by the insurance company to price the annuity and that assumed by Mitchell et al. may significantly affect the EPV.
As a check, we calculated the annuity that an individual could purchase at each age from 51 to 105 if insurance companies sold actuarially fair annuities, priced using a 3 % real return and the basic annuity 2000 period mortality table.
12 We then calculated the EPVs of the annuities at the same interest rate, using population mortality tables for the appropriate birth cohorts. At age 65, the EPVs for men and women were 86 and 92 % respectively. By age 80, the male expected present value had decreased to 82 %, but the female had increased to 96 %. If insurance companies 12 Basic means that it is formed from industry experience without an additional margin for conservatism. A period table predicts the current mortality of people of varying ages, in contrast to a cohort table that predicts the future mortality of people born in a particular year. We did not convert the table into a cohort table because we understand that the insurance industry does not use cohort tables to price annuities.
price annuities in this way, then the actuarial unfairness of female annuities would decrease significantly with age, and that of male annuities would increase marginally. This divergence in age-related trends in actuarial unfairness is surprising, but our finding offers no support for the belief that people with population life expectancy would face significantly greater actuarial unfairness were they to delay annuitization. An individual who postpones annuitization does however face the risk that insurance companies might increase annuity prices if long-term interest rates declined. This risk can be largely, if not wholly, hedged by investing in a portfolio of bonds of appropriate duration. What cannot be hedged is the risk that annuity prices might increase as a result of unexpected increases in longevity among the annuitant population. Brown and Poterba (2000) extended the analysis to married couples considering the purchase of a joint life and survivor annuity. They assumed that couples have a utility function of the following form
where l measures the jointness of consumption, C m t , C f t denote the consumption of the husband and wife at time t, and c is the coefficient of risk aversion. When l equals one, all consumption is joint. When l equals zero, none of the household's consumption is joint. They calculated 'annuity equivalent wealth ', the premium over expected present value at which a household would surrender the right to purchase an actuarially fair annuity. When there are no pre-existing annuities, annuity equivalent wealth (AEW) is simply the reciprocal of the wealth equivalent. With pre-existing annuities, this simple relationship breaks down.
The effect of marriage on the value of annuitization depends on whether the married couple is allowed to choose an annuity with a survivor benefit appropriate to its degree of risk aversion and the value of l in its utility function.
13 When l=0, the rate of interest equals the rate of time preference, and a real annuity is available, the optimal survivor benefit is 0.5 regardless of the degree of risk aversion.
14 When l=1, the optimal survivor benefit increases from 0.5 with log utility to almost 1 at very high levels of risk aversion. When l=0.5 and c equals five it is 0.652.
Married couples value annuitization less highly than do single individuals, regardless of the degree of risk aversion, particularity when much of the household's consumption is joint. This is a result of the ability of couples to pool longevity risk. Assuming population mortality, no pre-existing annuities, a coefficient of risk aversion of two, a rate of time preference and a real rate of interest both of 3 %, and a rate of inflation of 3.2 %, Brown and Poterba calculate annuity equivalent wealth for a 65-year old single man to be 1.576. When l equals zero, they calculate the annuity 13 If the survivor benefit is inappropriate, or if, in a model with constant inflation, the household is not permitted to purchase an increasing annuity, the value of annuitization also depends on whether fully annuitized households are permitted to save out of their annuity income and to purchase additional annuities with their savings. Brown and Poterba tell us that their households are permitted to save but not to purchase additional annuities. 14 Brown and Poterba obtain somewhat higher values for annuity equivalent wealth when the survivor ration is 2/3. This is a result of assuming that the payments from the annuity decline in real terms.
equivalent wealth of a joint life and 50% survivor annuity to be 1.244 under the same assumptions. Marriage decreases the value of annuitization by 58 %. When the coefficient of risk aversion equals ten, their comparable figures are 1.703, 1.407, and 42%. At higher values of l annuitization is even less valuable to married couples, particularly if the annuity has an inappropriate survivor benefit. When l equals one and the degree of risk aversion equals ten, the optimal survivor benefit is 97%. We replicate Brown and Poterba's calculations and find that the annuity equivalent wealth of a joint life and 50 % survivor annuity is only 1.108. Annuitization has very little value because a 50% survivor annuity gives too little income to the surviving spouse. Even with a 100% survivor benefit, we calculate that annuity equivalent wealth is still only 1.278, significantly less than their value of 1.407 when l equals zero. The reciprocals of these results can be compared with the annuity EPVs calculated by Mitchell et al. (1999) . Using the corporate bond yield curve and population mortality tables, Mitchell et al. calculated the expected present value of a joint and survivor annuity at age 65 to be 79.2 %. Assuming zero complementarity in consumption and no bequest motive, we calculate that is it only optimal for a couple with half its wealth pre-annuitized to annuitize its remaining wealth when its coefficient of risk aversion exceeds five. When three quarters of the couples' wealth is pre-annuitized, a coefficient of risk aversion greater than ten is required. The comparable numbers for people with annuitant mortality are 3 and 6.
It is unclear whether it is more appropriate to use annuitant or population mortality when analyzing the annuitization decision. There is a strong relationship between wealth and mortality, and many people with potentially annuitizable wealth may not only have lower than average mortality, but may also be aware of that fact. We defer further consideration of this issue to future research.
In practice, households can invest their unannuitized wealth in a variety of asset classes, and insurance companies offer not only nominal annuities but also annuities with payments linked to the returns on Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) and stock market securities. used numerical optimization to calculate the wealth equivalents of investment and inflation linked annuities. They found that for plausible degrees of risk aversion, households would generally value an investment-linked annuity more highly than a real annuity because the additional returns more than compensated for the volatility of prospective payments.
They also considered the impact of inflation on the value of nominal annuities. The inflation protection offered by a real annuity had only modest value. The wealth equivalent of nominal annuities decreased only slightly when they assumed i.i.d inflation calibrated to 1926-97 data. When they assumed that inflation followed an AR(1) process the wealth equivalent further decreased, but the difference was only substantial at high coefficients of risk aversion or when the individual had no preannuitized wealth.
The above literature compares annuitizing at some arbitrary age with the alternative of never annuitizing. If the household can do better by delaying, the above calculations will understate the value of annuitizing at the optimal age. Milevsky and Young (2003) used analytical techniques to calculate the optimal age at which to annuitize. They examined the decision faced by individuals, rather than couples, and used a Gompertz approximation to mortality tables.
15 In some specifications they permitted partial annuitization of unannuitized wealth. They assumed that actuarial unfairness reduced the returns on nominal and investment-linked annuities by 50 and 100 basis points respectively. When only nominal annuities are available but partial annuitization is not permitted, it is optimal for men and women to annuitize at ages 75 and 80 respectively when the coefficient of risk aversion equals two. The availability of investment-linked annuities greatly reduces the optimal age. When investment-linked annuities are also available, it becomes optimal for men and women to annuitize at 64 and at 71 respectively. When partial annuitization is permitted, it can sometimes be optimal to annuitize some of one's unannuitized wealth at retirement. They find that for a given level of pre-existing annuity income, individuals who are more risk-averse, and those with larger amounts of unannuitized wealth, will find immediate annuitization more attractive, a finding that we replicate in our own research.
There are relatively few empirical investigations of the determinants of voluntary annuitization. This is, no doubt, partly due to the rarity of its occurrence. Brown (2001) examined the annuitization plans of individuals who participated in DC plans and whose plans offered an annuitization option, and, using household level data, calculated annuity equivalent wealth for each household. In contrast with the very low levels of voluntary annuitization observed in the HRS and AHEAD datasets, he found that almost half of these individuals intended to annuitize their DC pension wealth. He also found that those with higher AEWs were more likely to report that they intended to annuitize.
When Brown wrote his paper, the HRS had only released data from the first two waves of the panel, plus preliminary data from the third. Only a few of the individuals in the study had retired. Our analysis of this data indicate that very few individuals had in fact annuitized by wave 5 when they were aged 59-69. Our simulations indicate that although it can sometimes be optimal for single women with DC plans and population average mortality to annuitize in their late sixties, it will almost invariably be optimal for married couples to delay annuitization until much more advanced ages or not annuitize at all. It is thus too soon to determine whether the HRS cohort will eventually act in accordance with their stated intentions.
Numerical simulations of the annuitization decision
We use numerical optimization techniques to calculate the optimal age at which to annuitize. We focus on the intertemporal evolution of the allocation of the household's portfolio between annuitized and unannuitized wealth. In contrast to previous research, we permit households to annuitize at any age, to annuitize any proportion of their wealth, and to return to the annuity market as many times as they wish. We study both married couples and single individuals, and examine how the level of actuarial unfairness, the existence of pre-annuitized wealth, and the household's degree of risk aversion affect the age at which it annuitizes and the amounts annuitized.
Following the previous literature, we consider households with both population and annuitant mortality. We use the Social Security Administration life tables for the 1930 male and 1933 female birth cohorts to forecast population mortality, and follow the methodology used by Mitchell et al. (1999) to construct cohort annuitant life tables.
In all our models, we follow Brown and Poterba (2000) and assume that the household's utility function takes the form set out in equation (1). The cost of an annuity is as follows :
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( 2) where A is the annual amount payable when both husband and wife are alive, P t m , P t f are the respective probabilities of a man and woman surviving to time t+1, r t and i t are the real interest rate and inflation rate at time t, a t is the reciprocal of the expected present value of the annuity, and Y m , Y f are the husband's and wife's survivor benefits expressed as a decimal of the initial amount payable. For ease of computation, we assume that couples are only able to purchase annuities with 2/3 survivor benefits. LIMRA (1997) reports that insurance companies are willing to offer annuities with almost any survivor benefit. Surviving spouses are, of course, only able to buy single life annuities. Pre-annuitized wealth is assumed to be held in a real joint life and 2/3 survivor real annuity. This corresponds with the Social Security annuity provided to a household in which the wife's pension is paid by reason of her husband's contributions. As previously discussed, we also assume that the expected present value of an annuity does not vary with age.
We assume that the inflation rate is 0%, the rate of time preference is 1 1:03, the real rate of interest is 3%, and that the wife is three years younger than the husband, the average for the cohort entering retirement. The insurance market offers not only level but also increasing annuities, and our assumption of zero inflation is therefore equivalent to assuming the purchase of a nominal annuity increasing at a fixed rate of inflation. The only uncertainty in the model relates to the date of death. There is a single risk-free asset paying a fixed 3% return in which both households and insurance companies can invest. Neither equities nor variable annuities are available, and as both mortality and interest rates are fixed there is no uncertainty over the future course of annuity prices. The insurance company prices the annuity by reference to the return on this asset and the ages of the annuitants, assuming annuitant mortality appropriate to the 1930 male and 1933 female birth cohorts.
16 The income from the annuity is then reduced by an amount that reflects previous calculations of the actuarial unfairness of annuities. Thus, delays in annuitization are the result of actuarial unfairness, rather than of a desire to earn a higher rate of return on investment in risky assets. Our models incorporate a transaction cost of $250. Our analyses of annuity rates suggest that insurance companies face only small fixed costs of producing annuities.
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The transaction cost is intended to cover the psychic and time costs of making the annuitization decision. In the absence of this transaction cost, households would optimally choose to annuitize small amounts of their wealth over several years. The transaction cost has little effect on the age at which annuitization starts or the proportion of wealth that the household annuitizes, but generally has the effect of making households purchase only a single annuity over their lifetimes, consistent with our analysis of annuitization patterns in the AHEAD. For example, when the coefficient of risk aversion equals two, the household has population mortality, the annuity expected present value is 85.7 %, and there is no pre-annuitized wealth, doubling the charge leaves the optimal annuitization age unchanged but decreases the amount that the household annuitizes by 3% of initial wealth. Halving the charge to $125 results in the household annuitizing two years earlier, returning for a second purchase after an interval of four years. The household's annuitized wealth after the second purchase is almost identical to that of the household facing the $250 transaction charge.
We report in Table 3a the ages at which our numerical simulations indicate that households with population life expectancy and varying degrees of risk aversion should start annuitizing their financial wealth. It also shows the proportion of initial financial wealth remaining immediately prior to annuitization. We report results for married couples, single men and single women; for risk aversion coefficients of one, two and five ; pre-annuitized proportions of total wealth of zero, 50 and 75 % ; and for annuity EPVs of 85.7 and 79.2 %. These correspond to the average of Mitchell et al.'s ages 65 and 75 annuity present values, calculated by reference to the Treasury and corporate bond interest rates respectively. We also report in Table 3b corresponding results for households with annuitant mortality. In the simulations with annuitant mortality we assume annuity EPVs of 92.6 and 84.9 %. These correspond to the averages of the age 65 and age 75 EPVs for individuals with annuitant mortality, again discounting the annuity income at the Treasury strip and corporate bond interest rates, respectively. As a reality check, we also ran simulations assuming no actuarial unfairness, and found that all household types annuitized immediately, even when the annuity provided an inappropriate survivor benefit.
Increasing the proportion of pre-annuitized wealth, decreasing the coefficient of risk aversion or decreasing the expected present value of the annuity, decreases the value of annuitization. Households respond by first postponing annuitization and reducing the proportion of their wealth that they annuitize, and only then, if the value of annuitization is sufficiently low, foregoing the purchase of an annuity altogether.
Households of all types are more likely to annuitize, and to annuitize at younger ages if they have a large coefficient of risk aversion, a small proportion of pre-annuitized wealth, and are able to annuitize on relatively favorable terms. However, for any given set of parameter values there are substantial differences between singles and Table 3a . Optimal ages at which to start the process of annuitizing one's wealth using population mortality tables Couple  77  59  83  38  Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  65  100  71  83  Risk aversion=5 Couple  70  85  74  74  Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  65  100  70  88  50 % wealth pre-annuitized  Risk aversion=1 Couple  Never  0  Never  0  Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  65  100  70  77  Risk aversion=2 Couple  Never  0  Never  0  Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  66  96  69  87  Risk aversion=5 Couple  73  73  82  44  Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  65  100  70  87  75 % wealth pre-annuitized  Risk aversion=1 Couple  Never  0  Never  0  Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  66  94  Never  0  Risk aversion=2 Couple  Never  0  Never  0  Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  65  100  70  78  Risk aversion=5 Couple  Never  0  Never  0  Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  65  100  71  82 Notes: l=0.5, b=0.9709, r=0.03, wife three years younger than husband, SSA mortality table for 1930 male and 1933 female birth cohorts, 2/3 annuity survivor benefit. married couples regarding whether, when and how much, they should annuitize. Even when a household annuitizes, it usually annuitizes only a proportion of its wealth. It sometimes returns to the annuity market after a few years to make one or more additional, smaller purchases. Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  65  100  65  100  Risk aversion=2 Couple  77  58  Never  -Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  65  100  74  70  Risk aversion=5 Couple  69  89  80  61  Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  65  100  65  100  75 % wealth pre-annuitized  Risk aversion=1 Couple  Never  -Never  -Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  65  100  Never  -Risk aversion=2 Couple  Never  -Never  -Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  65  100  65  100  Risk aversion=5 Couple  80  18  Never  -Single male  65  100  65  100  Single female  65  100  65  100 Notes : l=0.5, b=0.9709, r=0.03, wife three years younger than husband, annuitant mortality, per narrative on page 14, 2/3 survivor benefit.
Considering first those households with population life expectancy, in none of the cases examined is it optimal for a married couple to annuitize before age 70. In many cases it is optimal to annuitize in the late seventies and in others it is optimal never to annuitize. Quite small changes in the assumptions can change the optimal age by several years. For example, when no wealth is pre-annuitized, an increase in the degree of risk aversion from one to two decreases the optimal age by six years.
When the coefficient of risk aversion is small or the couple has a large proportion of pre-annuitized wealth, they spend down their unannuitized wealth quite rapidly. This decreases both the proportion of unannuitized wealth and the attractiveness of annuitization. By the time they reach the ages at which the annuitization of even small proportions of wealth would be worthwhile, all their unannuitized wealth has been consumed.
It is noteworthy that the cases in which additional annuitization is not optimal are primarily those with a high degree of pre-annuitized wealth. In these cases, the optimal degree of annuitization is still quite high, but the household's demand for annuities is met by employer pensions and Social Security, with the result that private purchases of annuities are not required. One implication of this result is that we may expect to see increasing demand for voluntary annuitization if annuitized is displaced by unannuitized wealth.
In contrast, single men and women, unable to pool risk within the household, invariably annuitize at age 65, or soon thereafter, even at low levels of risk aversion, high proportions of pre-annuitized wealth, and substantial degrees of actuarial unfairness. It will usually be optimal for surviving spouses to annuitize immediately on the death of their partner. Figure 1 shows the optimal paths for consumption, unannuitized and total wealth for a married couple with population mortality and with half its wealth preannuitized. We assume that the household's wealth comprises $280,000 cash plus a Social Security pension of $18,000 a year, reducing to $12,000 on the death of either spouse. The expected present discounted value of the pension equals $280,000, so half of the household's wealth is pre-annuitized. The household's coefficient of risk aversion is one, the real rate of return and the rate of time preference both equal 3%, the annuity's expected present value is 79.2 %, and l=0.5. The first panel shows the couple's consumption path from age 65 to age 105 for the case in which both spouses survive to that age. The second panel shows the evolution of the household's wealth excluding Social Security. They never annuitize, and both consumption and wealth decline until age 90 when they exhaust all their financial wealth. Thereafter, they rely upon Social Security to finance consumption. Figure 2 shows the same data for the case in which the coefficient of risk aversion equals five. Consumption declines more slowly prior to annuitization, reflecting the smaller intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and the household first annuitizes at age 82. At that age, 44 % of the couple's wealth remains unconsumed. They only annuitize 17% of their remaining wealth as there are decreasing marginal returns to annuitization. They finally exhaust their unannuitized wealth at age 100.
We attempted to replicate the calculation by Milevsky and Young (2003) that single men and women with a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2 and no pre-annuitized wealth should annuitize at ages 64 and 71, respectively, when variable annuities are available. Their expense load corresponds to an expected present value of 91.2 %, at which level we calculate that both men and women should annuitize at 65, the age at which we start our simulation. The first panel shows the optimal consumption path for a married couple and the second panel shows the optimal decumulation path of household wealth excluding social security and the amount of wealth, if any, that is annuitized. This simulation assumes CRRA=1, EPDV=79.2 %, 50 % pre-annuitized wealth, l=0.5, both spouses survive to age 105, population mortality, and a real rate of return and rate of time preferences both equal to 3 %. In the above example the household undertakes an optimal decumulation of its unannuitized wealth. It never annuitizes, and after its unannuitized wealth is exhausted the household consumes an amount equal to its social security income.
We suspect that our model predicts earlier annuitization than Milevsky and Young's because their model, while assuming uncertain investment returns, does not permit the individual to save out of his annuity income. Under constant relative risk aversion, the marginal utility of consumption is convex, and uncertainty over Figure 1 , with the expectation that the coefficient of risk aversion now equals five. Here consumption declines more slowly, and the household postpones annuitization until age 82, when it annuitizes only a part of its unannuitized wealth. It exhausts its unannuitized wealth at age 100. future consumption leads households to undertake precautionary saving. We conjecture that their model underestimates the value of annuitization by preventing households receiving uncertain income from variable annuities from undertaking desired precautionary saving.
As one might expect, households with annuitant mortality find annuitization more attractive than those with population mortality. They annuitize at lower degrees of risk aversion and higher proportions of pre-annuitized wealth. When they do annuitize, they annuitize a larger proportion of their initial wealth, and make their purchases at younger ages. Warner and Pleeter (2001) argue that many households might have quite high discount rates. We considered how the rate of time preference might affect the behavior of a married couple with annuitant mortality and with half its wealth preannuitized. At our base case discount rate of 3%, it is optimal to annuitize at age 69 when the coefficient of risk-aversion is five, at age 77 when it is two, and to never annuitize when it is one. At a discount rate of 5%, it is optimal to annuitize a portion of unannuitized wealth at age 70 when the coefficient of risk aversion is five, and at age 78 when the coefficient of risk aversion is two. At a discount rate of 10% it is optimal to annuitize at age 72 when the coefficient of risk aversion is five, and never annuitize when it is two. Increasing the rate of time preference has the effect of increasing the optimal age at which to annuitize and of decreasing the amount annuitized, and it can sometimes shift the balance of advantage against annuitization, Impatience decreases the value of annuitization because the household prefers a declining consumption path, something that a level annuity cannot offer once unannuitized wealth has been exhausted.
Empirical investigation of the annuitization decision
We use our numerical optimization program to calculate the optimal annuitization strategies of the average households in the HRS and AHEAD cohorts. We use coefficients of risk aversion of 1, 2, and 5, and EPVs of 85.7 and 79.2 %, and consider married couples and single women separately.
As we are studying the average household, we assume that they believe they have population average mortality, consistent with rational expectations. Wealthier households will generally have smaller proportions of pre-annuitized wealth and lower mortality, and will therefore value annuitization more highly. As explained previously, we defer consideration of this issue to further research.
We classify households according to whether they have no pension, have a DB plan, and, in the case of the HRS cohort, whether they only have a DC plan. We calculate the mean annuitized percentage of financial wealth for the median 20% of the households in each category. To simulate the effect of the displacement of DB by DC pension wealth, we also calculate the annuitized percentage for DB households in the HRS, assuming that DB wealth has been replaced by an equivalent amount of DC wealth. Table 4 reports our results. It is never optimal for married couples in the HRS to annuitize at either of the assumed expected present values, regardless of pension type risk-averse, but is also evaluating the expected present value of the annuity by reference to the lower treasury strip interest rate.
To simulate the effect of the displacement of annuitized DB pension wealth by unannuitized DC wealth, we calculate optimal annuitization strategies, assuming that the mean amount of annuitized DB wealth held by the median 20 % of households has been replaced by an equal amount of annuitized wealth. It can then be optimal to annuitize, but only at age 78, and only if the degrees of risk aversion and actuarial unfairness are at the top and bottom, respectively, of our assumed ranges.
The proportions of unannuitized wealth held by single women who have no pension or who have a DB plan are too small to make annuitization worthwhile at any of our assumed levels of risk aversion or degrees of actuarial unfairness. The small number of single women with DC plans will generally wish to annuitize almost immediately on retirement, as will those whose DB wealth has been displaced by an equivalent amount of DC wealth. Unlike married couples it is rarely optimal for single women to postpone annuitization regardless of their degree of risk aversion or the level of unfairness of annuity. It is a case of now or never. If they choose not to annuitize on retirement their rate of decumulation of unannuitized wealth is sufficient to insure that their proportion of unannuitized wealth always remains below the level at which annuitization would be beneficial. There are insufficient single men to produce meaningful statistics. Their optimal annuitization strategies would however closely resemble those of single women with similar proportions of pre-annuitized wealth.
We then consider the annuitization decision faced by the AHEAD households. Married couples will only wish to annuitize when they are risk averse, when they have no DB pension, and when they discount the annuity payments at the Treasury bill rate of interest. Those who decide to annuitize will wish to do so immediately. Single women will generally wish to annuitize immediately regardless of pension type.
The inconsistency between the HRS and the AHEAD results reflects the fact that our simulations predict that the HRS cohort will have much less financial wealth by the time they reach the ages of the AHEAD cohort than is currently held by the latter cohort. We do not, of course, know what amounts of financial wealth the AHEAD cohort at age 65, but it seems unlikely that their wealth would have exceeded that of the HRS cohort. The apparent failure of the AHEAD cohort to decumulate to the extent predicted by our simulations may possibly reflect unexpected stock market gains, precautionary saving, or survivor bias.
Our results show that if there is an ' annuity puzzle ' among households at median wealth levels, it is primarily among single individuals. These single individuals generally have very modest amounts of annuitizable wealth and it is possible that liquidity considerations play a part in explaining their failure to annuitize.
Conclusions
Previous research into annuitization has typically assumed that 50% of the wealth of households entering retirement is compulsorily annuitized. Our analysis of the HRS shows that this is a very considerable underestimate and that the average percentage of financial wealth that is compulsorily annuitized only falls to 50% in the top decile of total wealth. As a result, previous authors have considerably overestimated the value of annuitization to the average household.
The focus of this paper is on the behavior of the median household. Our simulations indicate that, for all pension types, one need look no further than the high proportion of pre-annuitized wealth for the failure of the median currently retired married couple to voluntarily annuitize.
The behavior of single women is more puzzling, as our research suggests that they ought to value annuitization more highly despite their greater proportions of pre-annuitized wealth. But the median single woman has only $26,075 of potentially annuitizable wealth, and at such low wealth levels it is possible that liquidity concerns influence their decision. There were insufficient single men in our sample to permit a detailed analysis by pension type, but much of what we say about single women probably also applies to single men.
The displacement of DB by DC pension wealth will lead to a fall in the preannuitized proportion of household wealth that may result in increasing levels of voluntary annuitization among more risk-averse households. Whether it will, in fact, do so, depends on the presence of other impediments to voluntary annuitization such as those considered by .
Annuitization may well be more attractive to wealthier couples, who have lower average mortality and smaller proportions of pre-annuitized wealth. On the other hand, these households may also have a stronger bequest motive. We defer modeling the behavior of such households to future research.
l the jointness of consumption. The number of years by which the age of the husband exceeds that of the wife is assumed to be three years, the average for the cohort. The rate of time preference, which we assume to be 1/1.03 unless otherwise stated. The inflation rate, which in the results we report is always assumed to be zero. The fixed cost incurred every time an annuity is purchased, which unless otherwise stated is assumed to be $250. The real interest rate, assumed to be 3 %. The survivor benefit payable under a joint life voluntary annuity, which we assume to be 2/3. The extent to which the annuity is less than actuarially fair. The annual survival probabilities from age 55 to age 105 obtained from Social Security cohort life tables for the 1930 male and 1933 female birth cohorts or from the cohort annuitant life table that we construct. These data are available from the authors on request. The age at which we start the analysis. We only report results for married couples aged 65 and 62 respectively, and single men and women both aged 65.
Under constant relative risk aversion, the results are invariant to scaling parameters, we assume that the household has $18,000 of annuity income when both are alive, reducing to $12,000 on the death of either spouse, and then give the household an amount of unannuitized wealth such that the present value of the annuity income is the appropriate percentage of the household's wealth, inclusive of that income.
Methodology
Each period, the household receives income from Social Security, interest on its investments in the risk-free asset, and income from any annuities it has purchased. It must make two choices, how much to consume, and how much of its unconsumed wealth to annuitize. The household can annuitize any part of its unannuitized wealth at any age, and can return to the annuity market as many times as it wishes. The household knows that each partner faces some probability of death each period. The insurance company prices the annuity by reference to the same life table, and the same risk-free interest rate, subject to an adjustment for actuarial unfairness, and to the $250 shopping cost referred to previously. It follows that the yield obtainable on the annuity increases with age. At any given age, it is highest for single men and lowest for married couples.
As there is a single risk-free asset there is no uncertainty as to the future course of interest rates, and as the single asset is available in both annuitized and unannuitized form, there is no incentive to delay annuitization to reap the benefit of the equity premium. The members of the household do not change their mortality beliefs.
The household chooses a strategy, a complete set of plans telling it in advance exactly how much to consume and how much to annuitize, in every possible set of mortality outcomes. For example, the plan will tell it what to do at age 66 in the event of both partners surviving, or only the husband surviving, or only the wife surviving. The objective of the plans is to maximize the household's expected discounted utility.
To calculate the plans, we work back from age 105, when all surviving members of the household die. As there is no bequest motive, the optimal strategy is to consume everything in the final year. We calculate, for each possible amount of wealth with which the household might enter the final year, the utility that the household would enjoy. If, at age 104, both spouses are alive, the expected utility equals the utility that the consumption would give a married couple, multiplied by the probability that both spouses survive to age 105, the utility that the consumption would give to a single man, multiplied by the probability that the wife dies and the husband survives, and so on.
We then work back to age 104. The household could conceivably consume all its wealth at age 104, but that would not be sensible, because in the event of either or both members of the household surviving to age 105, they would starve, and, under the model, would receive large negative utility. For each possible amount of wealth with which the household might arrive at age 104, we calculate a consumption and annuitization strategy that maximizes expected discounted utility for the final two years of life. We continue iteratively back to age 65.
In practice, we cannot consider every possible amount of wealth with which the members of the household might enter each year. We set up a grid, arrive at a set of strategies, and then lay down a second grid in the neighborhood of where we believe the optimal strategy lies. Finally, we interpolate between grid points. The fine grid, combined with the interpolation routine, allow for a high degree of precision.
